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Abstract 
  This paper builds a game theoretic model to investigate credibility in monetary policy when 
inflation targets are not set by the monetary authority and there is uncertainty about the preferences 
of the central banker. Under reasonable assumptions, the model shows that in countries with greater 
dispersion in central bankers’ preferences, as it is the case in a number of developing nations, 
strong-type central bankers have to be more conservative to persuade society of their commitment 
to  controlling  inflation.  The  model  also  shows  that  inflation  targets  have  a  role  in  anchoring 
expectations even when the central banker highly values output expansions.  
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Since March 1990, when New Zealand became the first country to formally adopt an inflation 
targeting regime, 24 additional countries have embraced this new approach to monetary policy.
1 
Conquering highly industrialized countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, transition 
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economies such as Poland and Hungary, and developing countries such as Brazil and Thailand, 
the expansion of the inflation targeting monetary regime has been impressive. 
One  fundamental  characteristic  of  this  monetary  regime  is  that  inflation  targets  are 
announced in advance to society. Therefore, inflation expectations based on the announcements 
and  credibility  about  the  central  banker’s  ability  and  willingness  to  deliver  the  publicized 
inflation rate play a crucial role in the workings of the system. 
The role of inflation expectations in short-run output variations has been widely studied 
since the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). With 
the  advent  of  the  economics  of  information,  several  models  have  analyzed  the  effects  of 
asymmetric information on the outcome of the monetary policy game played between the central 
bank and society.  
Canzoneri (1985) presents an infinite repeated game between society and a central bank. 
At each period t, society first sets inflation expectations, and the central banker next chooses 
inflation. However, realized real inflation in period t is affected by a stochastic component to 
money demand dt = et + et. The model focuses on imperfect asymmetric information on dt: the 
central banker observes et before choosing inflation but society only observes dt at the end of the 
period. Because society does not distinguish between et and et, the central banker can create 
unexpected inflation and attribute it to the unexpected shock et. The solution to the model follows 
Green and Porter (1984) and finds a trigger strategy equilibrium in which society sets an inflation 
threshold so that, if realized inflation is below that threshold society expects the Pareto-superior 
low inflation, but if realized inflation is above that threshold society expects the higher Nash 
inflation  for  a  punishment  period.  The  model  explains  periods  of  high  inflation  and  low   3 
employment (stagflation) triggered by the stochastic component of money demand, rather than by 
the traditional time inconsistency incentives. 
Backus and Driffill (1985) focus on incomplete asymmetric information about the type of 
the  central banker,  who could be  wet  or  hard-nosed.  A  wet  central  banker  cares  both  about 
controlling  inflation  and  employment  whereas  a  hard-nosed  central  banker  only  cares  about 
controlling  inflation.  The  paper  considers  a  finite  horizon  game  between  society  -who  sets 
inflation  expectations-  and  the  central  banker  -who  chooses  inflation-  and  finds  a  mixed-
strategy partially-pooling equilibrium in which the wet central banker mimics the hard-nosed one 
with positive probability. In their  models inflation may be lower than  expected in the initial 
periods of the game and higher in the final period. 
 Vickers (1986) presents a more general game where all types of central banker care both 
about  low  inflation  and  high  employment,  but  they  have  different  relative  preferences  for 
inflation and unemployment. The paper focus on a signaling, separating equilibrium in which the 
central banker who most values employment (wet) is not able mimic the central banker who most 
values low inflation (dry). The game consists of two periods and in equilibrium there will be a 
recession in the first period if the central banker is dry and there will expansion if he is wet. 
Moreover, there will be no surprises in the last period, as all relevant information becomes public 
in equilibrium. In that paper, as well as in Backus and Driffill (1985), the central banker cannot 
commit to an announced target. Therefore, there are no explicit inflation targets.  
Cukierman  and  Liviatan  (1991)  extend  Vickers’s  model  by  letting  the  central  banker 
announce inflation targets before society sets its inflation expectations, in a two period setup. In 
their model, a strong central banker will always achieve the exact announced inflation target, 
whereas a weak one may deviate from the announced target. Walsh (2001) and Bugarin and   4 
Carvalho (2005) analyze the monetary equilibria of an extension of Cukierman and Liviatan’s 
setup to an infinite game where a central banker has a fixed two-period nonrenewable term of 
office. 
  Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), Walsh (2001) and Bugarin and Carvalho (2005) allow for 
announcements of inflation targets, with the assumptions that the announcement is a strategic 
variable  chosen  by  the  central  banker  and  the  strong  central  banker  always  delivers  on  his 
announced target.  
It has been standard in the theoretic literature to assume that inflation targets are set by the 
monetary authority. However, analyzing inflation targeting (IT) countries’ monetary institutions, 
one can easily check that in most cases the central banker does not have the autonomy to set the 
inflation targets. Indeed, according to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)’s Table 2, only 5 out 
of 19 IT countries allow their central bankers to independently choose the inflation targets.
2 In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, the target is set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In Poland, the 
target is set by the Monetary Policy Council, which consists of the President of the National Bank 
of Poland and nine other members appointed in equal numbers by the President of the Republic, 
the Sejm and the Senate of the Parliament. In Brazil, it is also the Monetary Policy Council 
(CMN), comprised of the Finance Minister, the Minister of Budget and Planning and the Central 
Bank’s governor, which decides on inflation targets.  
In some of these cases, the monetary authority has exerted the greatest influence in the 
process of deciding the target. However, there is evidence that the other parties also play a role in 
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4 This is the simplest way to introduce the traditional trade-off between inflation and growth and follows the seminal 
articles by Vickers (1986) and Cukierman and Liviatan (1991). For a more detailed derivation of such a reduced form 
see, for example, Walsh (2000).   5 
the  process,  especially  in  times  of  political  turmoil.  The  mere  existence  of  an  institutional 
framework that  enforces  mutual understanding  among  potentially  conflicting members of  the 
government implies that the standard assumption that central bankers set inflation targets may 
leave behind important dynamics in monetary policy models. In order to better understand the 
monetary equilibrium when the central banker does not set inflation targets, the present study 
extends  the  models  of  Vickers  (1986)  and  Cukierman  and  Liviatan  (1991)  by  introducing 
exogenously determined inflation targets and not requiring that any type of central banker achieve 
the exact target. These assumptions allow us to analyze the importance of inflation targets and 
credibility  to  the  formation  of  inflation  expectations  when  society  has  imperfect  information 
about the central banker’s characteristics.  
The most important result of the model is that, under reasonable assumptions about the 
discount factor (d ³ 1/2), a higher dispersion in central bankers’ preferences causes a strong-type 
central banker to be tougher on its delivered inflation rates so as to signal his type to society. In 
other words, in countries where different types of central bankers have very distinct preferences 
for  monetary  policy,  disinflation  policies  will  be  costlier.  If  one  believes  that  developing 
countries tend to be more heterogeneous, then the model explains why strong central bankers in 
those countries need to adopt very tight monetary policies in order to maintain credibility, as it 
seems to be the case in recent Brazilian monetary policy history.  
The model also shows that the exogenous inflation targets and target ranges have a role in 
anchoring expectations even when the central banker has greater preference for output expansion. 
Expectations will typically be higher than the center of the target, but the upper target range has 
an important role to build on credibility.    6 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds the theoretical model of credibility of 
an inflation-targeting monetary policy and finds its equilibria. Section 3 discusses the model’s 
implications. Section 4 applies the model to analyze the recent Brazilian monetary policy history. 
Finally, the last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. A model of credibility and inflation expectations formation with exogenous 
inflation targets  
Let us first set a central banker’s standard utility function at time t as:
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where   t p  is the inflation rate at time t set by the central banker,  t p  is the inflation target for time 
t that is exogenously set by the government, and 
e
t p is market inflation expectation for time t.  
The  parameter  0 ³ l   reflects  the  importance  the  central  banker  attributes  to  output 
expansion above trend levels, which is simplified in this model as the (positive) inflationary 
surprise, relative to the importance he attributes to reaching the inflation target.  
The first term on the right represents the (possibly political) cost the central banker incurs 
by not achieving the target. In inflation targeting regimes the farther away realized inflation is 
from the target, the stronger the social reaction to central banker’s policies. In certain countries 
this could even lead to appointing a new central banker.
5 Inflation targeting countries usually 
adopt target bands that are symmetric around the center of the target. Assuming a cost function 
                                                 
5 See New Zealand’s institutional framework in Walsh (1995).   7 
that is quadratic in the deviation of inflation from the target might be a suitable simplification to 
the common inflation targeting design. 
With only one type of central banker and targets exogenously set, the model will predict 
an inflation bias. First order conditions yield  l p p + = t t , which means that the central banker 
will always inflate above target levels. Assuming that expectations are rational, in this one-period 
game agents will anticipate the inflationary bias and thus no inflation surprises will arise, as 
t t
e
t p l p p = + = . 
Let us now allow for two possible types of central bankers, m and l,  l m ³ , who differ as 
to the relative importance each one privately attributes to output growth with respect to inflation 
stabilization.  Therefore,  a  central  banker  that  attributes  weight  l  to  output  expansion  cares 
relatively more about reaching the exogenous target than the central banker that attributes weight 
m, who cares relatively more about generating inflationary surprise.  The l-type central banker of 
is said to be strong, whereas the m-type is said to be weak.  
In a one period game, inflation set by the strong type is  l p p + = t
S
t , whereas the weak 
type’s is  m p p + = t
W
t . If society believes that the incumbent is of a strong type with probability 
r , inflation expectations will be a weighted average of inflation rates chosen by the strong and 







This simple analysis allows us to draw the following preliminary conclusions. If central 
bankers  cannot  pre-commit  to  an  inflation  target,  and  if  this  target  is  exogenously  set,  then 
inflation expectations will be biased upwards from the target. Realized inflation will also exceed 
the target, even if the central banker is of a strong type. Of course, the weaker the central banker 
is, the higher the deviation of realized inflation from targets. However, as expected inflation is an   8 
average  of  inflation  rates  optimally  chosen  by  a  weak  and  a  strong  central  banker,  realized 
inflation under a strong type will be lower than the one expected by society.  
Note that inflation targets, in spite of not being fulfilled, have a very important role in this 
model. As realized inflation is directly related to them, targets guide inflation expectations, thus 
working as a nominal anchor to the economy. This is the main feature of the inflation targeting 
regime. 
Plugging in realized and expected inflation into strong- and weak-type central bankers’ 
utilities yields respectively  ( )( ) l m r l l n - - - - = 1
2
1 2 S




t . Notice 
that both types gain with higher credibility in the central banker, which is modeled here as the 
parameter r, i.e., the higher r,  the more society believes that the central banker is strong. Indeed, 
if society attributes a higher probability that the central banker is strong, a strong type benefits 
from the reduction in society’s “pessimism”, and the model predicts lower inflation expectations 
and weaker recession. Moreover, the weak-type central banker benefits from higher inflationary 
surprise. 
 Let us now allow for a two-period game between society and the central banker. Let the 
central banker be chosen at random at the beginning of period 1, according to the distribution (r, 
1-r),  for  a  two-period  term.  A  time  invariant  inflation  target  is  concomitantly  set  by  the 
Executive branch or the Congress for periods 1 and 2:  p p p = = 2 1 . As before, the central banker 
may  be  either  weak  or  strong,  and  this  is  his  private  information.  Society  will  thus  form 
expectations based on its belief on the type of the central banker. After expectations have been 
formed, the central banker sets the inflation rate for period 1.  By observing realized inflation, 
society updates its belief about the type of the central banker and forms inflation expectations for   9 
period 2. After expectations have been formed, the central banker sets inflation for the second 
period and the game finishes. Society’s payoff is a direct measure of the accuracy of its inflation 
expectations.  
Figure 1  depicts  the  extensive form  of  the  game. The  stochastic determination of  the 
central banker’s type (S: strong, W: weak) is modeled by the use of nature (N) in the top decision 
node.  The  dotted  straight  lines  represent  information  sets  for  society  (Soc).  The  top  dotted 
straight line indicates that society does not know the central banker’s type when setting inflation 
expectations in period 1. The one on the bottom indicates that if both central bankers’ types 
choose the same inflation in period 1 in equilibrium, society cannot identify their types. The 
curved dotted lines indicate that the central banker (respectively society) has infinitely many 
possible  choices  for  inflation  (respectively,  for  inflation  expectations),  only  one  of  which  is 
represented in the game tree.  
 
2.1 – Separating Equilibrium 
In the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak central banker will reveal his type to 
society at the end of the first period. Therefore, he will choose to inflate at its optimal rate in 
every period.  Inflation surprises will thus occur only in the first period of the  game.  In this 
equilibrium,  realized  inflation  in  periods  1  and  2  under  a  weak  type  central  banker  will  be 
m p p p + = =
W W
2 1 .    10 
 




















On the other hand, a strong central banker may have incentives to deviate from its optimal 
complete information rate if this is necessary to induce the weak central banker not to mimic his 
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   11 
chosen inflation. Let 
S
1 p  be the inflation chosen by the strong central banker in period 1. Then, 
the consistent beliefs society holds in period 2, 
e
2 p , are the following: if the realized inflation in 
period 1 is lower or equal to 
S
1 p , then the central banker is strong; if it is above 
S
1 p , then the 
central  banker  is  weak.  Moreover,  society’s  expected  inflation  in  period  1  is  
( )( ) m p r rp p + - + = 1 1 1
S e .  
In order for the weak central banker not to mimic S’s choice, it must be the case that 
choosing his preferred inflation rate  m p p + =
W
1  and revealing his type to society yields a higher 
utility  than  choosing 
S
1 p ,  inducing  society  to  believe  he  is  strong,  and  gaining  from  the 
inflationary surprise at period 2. This will be the case if and only if the following condition holds: 
 
( ) ( )2
1
1 2 l m dm m p p - - + £
S   (2) 
 
Furthermore, any deviation from his optimal complete information policy is costly to the 
strong central banker. Therefore, he must be better off choosing 
S
1 p  than if he chooses the higher 
inflation  l p +  and lets society conclude that he is a weak central banker. This will be the case if 
and only if the condition below is satisfied. 
 
( ) ( )2
1
1 2 l m dl l p p - - + ³
S   (3) 
 
It  is  straightforward  to  check  that  ( ) ( )2
1
2 l m dl l p - - + ( ) ( )2
1
2 l m dm m p - - + £ . 
Therefore  there  is  a  range  of  values  for 
S
1 p   compatible  with  a  separating  perfect  Bayesian   12 
equilibrium. Note now that  ( ) ( )2
1
2 l m dm m p l p - - + £ +  if and only if  d
m
l




2 1- £ ,  then  only  the  inflation  rates  ( ) ( )  

 
 + - - + Î l p l m dl l p p , 2 2
1
1
S   belong  to  a 
perfect  Bayesian  equilibrium.
7  However,  only  the  optimal  inflation  l p p + =
S
1   satisfies  the 
intuitive criterion.
8 This corresponds to the case where the strong type can signal his type without 
any costly deviation from his complete information choice. 
On the other hand, if  d
m
l
2 1- > , then  ( ) ( ) l p l m dm m p + < - - + 2
1
2  and any perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium will require an inflation rate below the strong type’s preferred policy. In 
that case, every inflation rate  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  

 




1 2 , 2 l m dm m p l m dl l p p
S  belongs to a 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, only the choice  ( ) ( )2
1
1 2 l m dm m p p - - + =
S  satisfies the 
intuitive criterion
9.   
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S   the strong central banker would prefer to choose his optimal 
complete information inflation  l p + which would also signal his type. 




 + - - + l p l m dl l p , 2 2
1 . Then, choosing an inflation level closer to 
the right hand side of the interval, and convincing society that he is strong, increases the strong central banker’s 
utility. On the other hand, the weak central banker still prefers not to mimic the strong type’s policy. For a detailed 
exposition on the intuitive criterion see Cho & Kreps (1987). 
9 The argument is the same presented in the previous footnote.    13 
then  p p <
S
1 , i.e., in order to signal his type the strong central banker will keep inflation below 
the target p . Figure 2 summarizes the present analysis. 
 












Note that one can interpret the size of the  ratio 
m
l
 as the level of homogeneity of a 
society. Indeed, if l is very close to m, so that the quotient is close to one, there is not much 
divergence in the way different types of central bankers value output relatively to achieving the 
inflation target. This corresponds to the upper right corner of the figure when the discount factor 
d is high enough (bigger than 0.5). Conversely, if m is much bigger than l, then different types of 
central bankers diverge strongly and society is heterogeneous. This last case corresponds to the 
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If  one  believes  that  developing  economies  tend  to  be  more  heterogeneous  due  to  the 
strong political struggle between different sectors of society, then the present model suggests that 
a strong central banker needs to adopt a much more conservative monetary policy in developing 
countries, in order to convince society that he really is strong.  
 
2.2 – Pooling Equilibrium 
In the pooling equilibrium the weak central banker will mimic the strong type in the first period 
of the game. As society will observe a first-period rate of inflation that does not allow it to infer 
which type of central banker is in office, expectations for the second period will be a weighted 
average of likely inflation rates:  ( ) ( )m r rl p p r rp p - + + = - + = 1 1 2 2 2
W S e .  Let 
P
1 p  be inflation 
chosen by both types of central bankers in period 1. Then, society will anticipate that actual 
inflation rate and set: 
P W S e
1 1 1 1 p p p p = = = . The consistent beliefs in period 2 are as follows: if 
the realized inflation in period 1 is lower than or equal to 
P
1 p , then there is no updating in beliefs, 
i.e., society still believes that the central banker is strong with the same probability r ; if it is 
above 
P
1 p , then society concludes the central banker is weak. Given these beliefs, there cannot be 
a pooling equilibrium with  l p p + >
P
1 , as the strong  central banker would prefer to choose  
l p p + =
S
1 . Therefore, it must be the case that  l p p + £
P
1 . 
In a pooling equilibrium, the strong central banker will choose 
P
1 p  as long as this gives 
him a higher utility than selecting his preferred policy  l p +  and allowing society to believe that 
he is weak. This will be the case if and only if the condition below is satisfied: 
 
( ) ( )2
1
1 2 l m dlr l p p - - + ³
P   (4)   15 
 
Similarly,  the  weak  type  central  banker  will  choose  not  to  deviate  from  the  pooling 
equilibrium if the utility he attains in mimicking the strong type in the first period is higher than 
the utility he would derive if he inflated at his optimal discretionary rate in the first period, and 
thus revealed its type. This will be the case if and only if the condition below is satisfied: 
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  It is immediate to check that  ( ) ( )2
1
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1
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both  conditions  (4)  and  (5)  will  be  satisfied  if  and  only  if  ( ) ( )2
1
1 2 l m dmr m p p - - + ³
P . 
Furthermore,  one  must  have  l p p + £
P
1 .  But  ( ) ( )2
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1
P   corresponds  to  a 
perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium. 
Pooling will be more likely to occur if the difference between the weak and the strong 
types is not pronounced (m close to l, which, according to the previous discussion, corresponds to 
a more homogeneous society), the weak type significantly values the future  (d very high, close to 














i.e., r  is high). Figure 3 adds to Figure 2 the bold dotted line  rd
m
l
2 1- =  (with r<1/4); the 
region above that dotted line corresponds to the model’s pooling equilibria. 
 














3. Model implications  
This model makes explicit the role of “social stability” for the type of equilibrium that results. In 
a stable society the possible types of central bankers will not differ significantly among each 
other. As such, the 
m
l
 ratio will be close to 1, which induces either a pooling equilibrium or a 
separating equilibrium with low deviation from society’s expectations, i.e., low recession cost 
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region   17 
when a strong central banker wants to signal his type. The latter corresponds to the equilibria in 
the upper right corner of Figure 2. On the other hand, in unstable countries, which exhibit a high 
turnover of very distinct political parties in power, there will be higher heterogeneity of central 
bankers’  types.  This  heterogeneity  will  induce  a  separating  equilibrium  in  which  the  strong 
central banker needs to impose high recession costs to society in order to signal his type. This 
corresponds to the equilibria in the lower right corner of Figure 2. 
  That discussion brings about the issue of independence of the monetary authority and 
staggered terms for the Executive incumbent and the Central Bank’s  governor. Central Bank 
autonomy per se does not induce a reduction in heterogeneity of central bankers’ types. However, 
with a fragile institutional framework, the perspective of a change in political parties in power 
may enact an undesirable update of society’s priors on the type of the next central banker. As the 
model  showed,  if  society  attributes  a  higher  chance  for  the  next  central  banker  to  be  weak, 
inflation expectations will be higher, and should the real central banker be strong, there will be 
important recession costs to the economy. If the terms of the Central Bank and the Executive 
branch do not coincide, then the change of party in the Executive will not induce an immediate 
change in the Central Bank governor’s type; therefore, monetary policy and  society’s beliefs will 
be more stable during the transition to a new government. 
  Another important implication of the model is that forecasters recognize that the Central 
Bank will not reach the center of the target (p ) in the low deviation separating equilibria (upper 
right corner in Figure 2), even if the central banker attributes a higher relative importance to the 
variance of inflation around the targets. Therefore, credibility in this model should be interpreted 
as the likelihood that the central banker is strong in controlling inflation and not as the ability of 
the central banker to reach the center of the inflation target. In that regard, as we have shown, the 
higher the credibility of the central banker, the lower are inflation expectations.   18 
  If the center of inflation targets is usually not attained, then why should the government 
set an inflation target? As we have shown, the target directly affects central banker’s optimal 
choice of inflation. As such, it signals the future path of inflation to society. Therefore, this model 
confirms the “signaling” role of the inflation-targeting regime.  
If the authority that sets the target wishes, for instance, to reduce equilibrium inflation, it 
shall act strategically by setting a low target. In order to induce an average inflation of  2 ˆ p  in 
period 2, for instance, it should set a target  ( ) ( ) m r rl p p - + - = 1 ˆ2 .  
In addition, as there is usually a political cost associated with not achieving the targets, the 
authority that sets the targets shall reduce this cost by defining an inflation target range around 
the center p . If the target range is ( ) e p e p + -   ,   , such that  [ ) m l e , Î , then the target band will 
always be attained in the first period of the pooling equilibrium by any type of central banker and 
will always be achieved in the other equilibria should the central banker be strong. Note that if 
the political cost associated with the failure in achieving the targets is sufficiently high or if ex-
ante credibility of the Central Bank is low, it may be optimal for the authority setting the targets 
to choose a wider range. Notwithstanding, this enlargement of the range could come with some 
utility loss because of the lack of accuracy of the monetary policy. 
 
4. An application to Brazilian presidential elections  
Carvalho and Bugarin (2005) compare the formation rule of inflation expectations in three Latin 
American  countries: Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The study finds that in the particular case of 
Brazil, for some time in 2002 and 2003, inflation targets ceased to be an anchor to inflation 
forecasts. The misalignment of inflation forecasts may have stemmed from a number of sources, 
domestic and external. However, as external shocks were common to the two other countries   19 
investigated, it seems plausible to argue that domestic imbalances played a more important role 
for the weakening of credibility in inflation targets in Brazil.  
The strong misalignment of inflation forecasts coincided with the victory of a left-wing 
candidate, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, in the country’s presidential elections. As the Central Bank 
of Brazil has not been granted formal autonomy, and a new central banker was to be appointed by 
the  new  president,  there  appeared  to  be  high  uncertainty  regarding  the  future  conduct  of 
macroeconomic policy and, in particular, of the recently implemented inflation targeting regime.  
The behavior of inflation forecasts was a signal of what was yet to come. In the first 
quarters of 2003, there was evidence that the inertial component of inflation in Brazil had actually 
increased. Monetary policy was further tightened to assure the convergence of consumer price 
inflation to the targets. The tightening of monetary policy resulted in stagnation of the real output 
growth in 2003. It was only after June 2003 that inflation forecasts were again aligned to the 
targets, and the country resumed its growth path. 
Brazilian society has shown a diversity of opinions about how domestic monetary policy 
should be conducted. There is indeed an important debate on inflation control versus growth. In 
Brazilian politics, this debate opposes “orthodoxists” to “developmentists”. In the language of the 
present model, it appears that the Brazilian society expected significant differences in the conduct 
of monetary policy by different types of potential central bankers (large value for l−m). The new 
government meant a new central banker and society expected it to be weak with high probability 
(small value for r) due to the fact that a left wing president was elected, in spite of president 
Lula’s continued assurance that he would maintain the same monetary policy as its predecessor. 
Although monetary policy proved that the appointed central banker was tough on inflation, due 
both to the huge difference between possible weak and strong central banker preferences in Brazil   20 
(the size of l−m) and the low probability of a strong central banker (small r), the incumbent was 
forced  into  an  excessively  tight  monetary  policy  in  order  to  signal  his  type  in  a  separating 
equilibrium. As a consequence, the country witnessed stagnation in the first year of president 
Lula’s term. By the second year, however, the reputation of the central bank was well established, 
as his type was revealed to society, and the country experienced a high growth rate of about 5% 
of GDP.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This  paper  extended  a  theoretical  model  of  credibility  to  investigate  the  role  of  uncertainty 
regarding the type of a central banker on optimal monetary policy and formation of inflation 
expectations, in an environment where inflation targets are exogenously set by a government 
agency that is not the Central Bank.  
The model shows that “social stability” has important implications for monetary policy. 
Under  reasonable  values  of  the  discount  factor  (d  ³1/2),  in  more  heterogeneous  societies, 
monetary policy has to be more restrictive so as to build on credibility. On the other hand, in 
more homogeneous societies, the very presence of an inflationary bias will not be grounds for 
such a restrictive monetary policy. If one believes that developing countries tend to be more 
heterogeneous, then the model explains why strong central bankers in those countries need to 
adopt very tight monetary policies in order to maintain credibility, as it seems to be the case in the 
recent Brazilian monetary policy history. 
The model also shows that even when the center of a target range is hardly ever achieved, 
this center target has an important role in guiding inflation expectations. Therefore, the authority 
that sets the target has a strategic opportunity to choose target ranges that take into account the   21 
positive inflation bias that may exist even under a central banker that attributes a high relative 
weight to inflation stabilization.  
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